THOMPSON v. AIG HAWAII INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., 25207 (Haw. 10-11-2002)

TERRIE L. THOMPSON and DWIGHT THOMPSON, Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants-appellees v. AIG HAWAII INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., a Hawaii corporation; AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL ADJUSTMENT COMPANY, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendants/Counterclaimants/Cross-Claim Plaintiffs/Cross-Claim Defendants-Appellants, BURTON D. GOULD, Defendant/Cross-Claim Plaintiff/Cross-Claim Defendant LARRY MARK POLSKY, Defendant/Cross-Claim Plaintiff POLSKY GOULD, a Hawaii Partnership, Defendant/Cross-Claim Defendant JOSEPHINE D. MEDEIROS, Defendant/Cross-Claim Plaintiff JOHN DOES 2-10; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10; and DOE ENTITIES 1-10, Defendants

25207Supreme Court of Hawaii.
October 11, 2002.

APPEAL FROM THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT (CIV. NO. 93-0140)

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, RAMIL, AND ACOBA, JJ.

Upon review of the record, it appears that the June 18, 2002 judgment in Civil No. 93-0140, the Honorable Reinette W. Cooper presiding, does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 58 of the Hawai`i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP). “An appeal may be taken from circuit court orders resolving claims against parties only after the orders have been reduced to a judgment and the judgment has been entered in favor of and against the appropriate parties pursuant to HRCP 58[.]” Jenkins v. Cades Schutte Fleming Wright, 76 Hawai`i 115, 119, 869 P.2d 1334, 1338 (1994).

[I]f a judgment purports to be the final judgment in a case involving multiple claims or multiple parties, the judgment (a) must specifically identify the party or parties for and against whom the judgment is entered, and (b) must (i) identify the claims for which it is entered, and (ii) dismiss any claims not specifically identified[.]

Id.

For example: “Pursuant to the jury verdict entered on (date), judgment in the amount of $___ is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff X and against Defendant Y upon counts I through IV of the complaint.” A statement that declares “there are no other outstanding claims” is not a judgment. If the circuit court intends that claims other than those listed in the judgment language should be dismissed, it must say so; for example, “Defendant Y’s counterclaim is dismissed,” or “Judgment upon Defendant Y’s counterclaim is entered in favor of Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Z,” or “all other claims, counterclaims, and cross-claims are dismissed.”

Id. at 119-20 n. 4, 869 P.2d at 1338-39 n. 4 (emphases added). “[A]n appeal from any judgment will be dismissed as premature if the judgment does not, on its face, either resolve all claims against all parties or contain the finding necessary for certification under HRCP 54(b).” Id. at 119, 869 P.2d at 1338.

Although Plaintiffs-Appellees Terrie L. Thompson and Dwight Thompson’s amended complaint asserted eight separate causes of action against six different defendants, the June 18, 2002 judgment does not identify the claims for which it is entered. Therefore, the June 18, 2002 judgment does not satisfy the requirements of HRCP Rule 58 according to our holding in Jenkins v. Cades Schutte Fleming Wright, 76 Hawai`i at 119, 869 P.2d at 1338, and the Defendants-Appellants AIG Hawai`i Insurance Company, Inc., American International Adjustment Company, Inc.’s, appeal is premature. Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this appeal is dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.